

Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09BEIJING2963, deputy secretary steinberg's meeting with xxxxx

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09BEIJING2963**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09BEIJING2963	2009-10-26 00:14	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Embassy Beijing

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.spiegel.de>

VZCZCXRO0653
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #2963/01 2990014
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 260014Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6589
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI

S e c r e t section 01 of 02 beijing 002963

Sipdis

Pacom for fpa piccuta

E.o. 12958: decl: after korean unification
Tags: ovip (steinberg, james b.), prel, parm, pgov, econ,
etra, mnuc, marr, ch, jp, kn, ks, ir
Subject: deputy secretary steinberg's meeting with xxxxx
foreign minister he yafei, september 29, 2009

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.
4 (b) and (d).

11. (SBU) September 29, 2009; 8:30 a.m.; St. Regis Hotel, Beijing.

12. (SBU) Participants:

United states
Deputy Secretary Steinberg
Laura Stone (notetaker)

China
xxxxxx

Summary

11. (S) Summary: Deputy Secretary Steinberg explained U.S. confidence-building and transparency objectives vis-a-vis Iran that we planned to pursue at the October 1 P5-plus-1-plus-Iran Political Directors meeting. xxxxxx emphasized the importance of sustaining the dialogue, expressed hope that U.S. domestic political pressure would not lead the U.S. to pursue UN sanctions, and affirmed the need for monitoring, supervision and benchmarks. The Deputy Secretary rejected the idea that politics were motivating U.S. Iran policy, and made clear the U.S. position that we need to resolve, not just monitor and supervise, the Iranian nuclear problem. On the upcoming POTUS visit, xxxxxx suggested that a joint statement reflect the balanced, comprehensive nature of the relationship while also addressing each country's "core" interests. xxxxxx expressed worry that the Copenhagen climate change meeting could overshadow the trip. xxxxxx welcomed the institutionalized G-20, downplayed the importance of Premier Wen Jiabao's announced October 4-6 trip to Pyongyang, and bemoaned the U.S. 421 tire safeguards decision. End summary.

Iran

12. (S) The Deputy Secretary explained U.S. objectives for the October 1 P5-plus-1 Political Directors meeting with Iran. xxxxxx outlined actions in support of the pillars of confidence building and transparency that Iran needed to undertake to establish its seriousness in addressing the nuclear issue. On process objectives, the Deputy Secretary noted that the nuclear issue would need to remain the primary subject in follow-up experts meetings, although other agenda topics were possible.

13. (S) xxxxxx.
Based on Chinese communications with Iran, xxxxxx, xxxxxx thought it would be difficult for Iran to refuse talks, since entering into dialogue was the only way to diffuse tensions. xxxxxx was less certain about the prospect of Tehran giving up its nuclear program. xxxxxx asserted that because the weapons program was "not quite there yet" and the facilities were all dual-use in nature, Iran's assertions that the program was for peaceful use were "50-percent true." The key, according to xxxxxx, was monitoring and supervision, while establishing benchmarks that Iran should not cross.

14. (S) xxxxxx suggested that the first objective of the October 1 meeting with Iran should be to keep the dialogue alive. xxxxxx asked that the United States not reject Iranian attempts to broaden the conversation or create the impression that the talks were not making progress. Noting that President Obama had told President Hu Jintao that resolving the Iran situation was a pressing U.S. interest, xxxxxx asked how long the United States would remain patient in the face of limited progress. xxxxxx expressed hope that "domestic political pressure" would not lead the United States to seek new UN Security Council sanctions.

15. (S) The Deputy Secretary stated that domestic political factors were not driving our approach to Iran, but rather a

conviction -- shared by Britain and France -- of the need to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem. The nuclear issue needed to be discussed up front in talks; the process could not stay alive without Iran committing to some confidence-building measures. Monitoring and supervision were not adequate, as the North Korean case had demonstrated.

POTUS Visit

¶6. (C) xxxxx asked that the upcoming POTUS visit reflect the balanced, comprehensive nature of the relationship, including economic, security, cultural, economic and people-to-people ties. A joint statement should not be too detailed and should instead mirror the status of two of the world's most important leaders. That said, the statement had to address, in a positive way, both countries' "core" interests. xxxxx expressed worry that the early-December Copenhagen climate change meetings could overshadow the POTUS visit, and recommended that China and the United States focus during the visit on our respective national commitments in the realm of climate change.

¶7. (C) xxxxx raised xxxxx proposal for a "humanities" MOU that would cover people-to-people, cultural, and science and technology exchanges, saying xxxxx hoped to make this one of the "gems" of the visit. xxxxx suggested that the presidents sign the clean energy and environmental protection MOU.

G-20

¶8. (C) xxxxx thanked President Obama for his leadership in institutionalizing the G-20, which had created a "comfortable" platform for countries like China and India to play a larger role. xxxxx explained that there had been some domestic criticism of President Hu's participation in the G8-plus-5. xxxxx expressed hope that the United States would coordinate closely with China as we established new rules for the organization, and that it would not become an organization that duplicated the United Nations or the G-8. xxxxx expressed reservations about how fast the G-20 could expand to handle issues beyond economics and finance, but noted that if the organization was going to stay relevant for leaders it's scope would have to grow. xxxxx specifically mentioned the need for a coordinating mechanism on global diseases and counter-terrorism.

North Korea

¶9. (S) xxxxx downplayed Premier Wen Jiabao's upcoming October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang, stating "we may not like them," but "they (the DPRK) are a neighbor," and the trip was part of the 60th anniversary of relations celebrations. xxxxx stated that the Premier would convey a strong message on the need to denuclearize, to come back to the Six-Party talks, and to not abandon the Six-Party Talks framework. xxxxx noted that North Korea often tried to play China off the United States, refusing to convey information about U.S.-DPRK bilateral conversations. Clearly seeking a clarification for the record, xxxxx asked if the United States were prepared to accept a nuclear-armed but non-proliferating North Korea. The Deputy Secretary stated this was not acceptable or sustainable.

Tires

¶10. (C) xxxxx lamented the United States' recent 421 tire decision, and expressed concern that lawyers in the United States were preparing additional cases on products such as textiles. xxxxx opined that China and the United States relied too much on "technical" negotiators.

¶11. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.

